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ABSTRACT
Security and privacy have been increasingly important issues, es-
pecially surrounding privacy in consumer’s homes. Internet of
things devices, while providing opportunity, also provide danger
through poor or inconsistent implementation of security protocols
or hardening techniques. Security research around home connected
internet of things devices must then have more significant and sum-
mative research and literature to combat these dangers. This paper
presents an overview of existing research focusing on internet of
things devices intended for consumers in the home, discusses some
specific case studies of vulnerabilities in existing and common de-
vices, overviews some best practices as they’re suggested in various
papers, and finally adds some discussion on interesting solutions to
security in the connected internet of things home. This paper finds
that many home connected internet of things devices are lacking
minimal security, and that both consumption and production of
home connected internet of things devices require a security focus
in order to provide a stable foundation for this rapidly proliferating
infrastructure.
KEYWORDS
Internet of things, Internet of things security, connected home
devices, connected home device security, privacy issues, security
issues, security vulnerabilities, NIST
1 INTRODUCTION
The internet of things, as a concept, simultaneously has the poten-
tial to be one of the things that revolutionize markets, practices,
industries and lifestyles as we know it, and to be something that
grinds the progress of society to a halt with miscommunication
and sabotage. As it was coined in 1999 [9], the “internet of things”
loosely has the idea of a network of devices that live in things, in the
objects that we use to perform normal tasks, and which allow for a
constant stream of communication, data-collection, and computa-
tion [11] to allow for more and more ridiculous Star Trek-like feats
of industry [10]. There are many domains to this wide-reaching
concept of “the internet of things” , that can be somewhat nebu-
lously divided into categories like medical, industrial, commercial,
retail, consumer, transportation, vehicles, and on and on [17]. Think
Amazon Alexa to smart conveyor belts [3] to smart biodigesters
and in-hospital newborn-locators [7].
Security in the internet of things, then, needs to be a high priority,
since the more things you can do, and the more data you have, the
greater the potential for exploitation and manipulation.
In practice, things (their internet, and their security) are more
complicated.
This paper surveys the state of connected home internet of things
devices, highlighting existing literature on the topic of security of
internet of things devices, documented and researched vulnera-
bilities as they appear in common connected home devices, and
best practices for manufacturers, developers, and consumers of
connected home internet of things devices to mitigate potential
risks and vulnerabilities in their devices.
Quality of papers talking about IoT security and devices is quite
variable. Security and home IoT devices have hundreds of proposed
solutions, but very few comprehensive surveys of connected home
IoT security. Interesting surveys and white-papers will be men-
tioned later.
Additionally, this paper builds on existing research, laying out
the vulnerabilities for select devices and grouping similar vulnera-
bilities into the following categories:
(1) Application layer - data access/ recovery attacks, authenti-
cation issues
(2) Network layer - network protocol problems, port hardening,
reflection etc
(3) Perception layer - attacks dealing with fake IoT nodes, side
channel/ replay attacks, et cetera
This paper will not spend too much time on a multitude of
specific devices, since there’s often a security vulnerability in the
components that compose many different IoT products [16] and
engaging a more holistic approach to talking about security will
begin to tackle the issue of security at scale for a diverse range of
devices [31]. This paper will instead choose various characteristic
devices that represent a common category of consumer-focused,
connected home IoT devices.
There are many other efforts at cataloging common IoT vulner-
abilities, such as this list of common vulnerabilities [1], and this
paper will not go into too much depth into those lists, since themes
will tend to appear when looking at various IoT device security
vulnerabilities.
Finally, this paper will highlight best security practices for users
and producers of connected home internet of things devices, as
well as discussing a few interesting potential solutions to various
inherent problems to securing internet of things devices.
2 EXISTING LITERATURE
In [28], the authors give a detailed survey of inherent security vul-
nerabilities (via protocols or compromised techniques or practices)
and privacy challenges in the three layers of IoT devices (percep-
tion, application, network). The authors organize the survey to help
with the state of security in IoT devices as of publication, as well as
potential steps for further securing IoT devices in the future.
This survey addresses the same problem and goes about solving
it in a similar way to the current paper, cataloging vulnerabilities
and challenges in IoT devices as well as providing a taxonomy of the
field as it stands with respect to security. The difference between
work of the two is that the Mendez survey catalogs IoT security in
general, tackling a wide variety of protocols and software intended
to address different domains of IoT devices. This paper focuses
more specifically on connected home IoT devices, providing a more
focused look at security in a domain of IoT devices that has a huge
potential for affecting lives of general consumers of new connected
smart home devices. As well as focusing on this specific domain,
this paper references other related work in this field, providing a
larger network of security research for manufacturers, developers,
and security researchers to draw on to develop more secure IoT
devices.
The OpenWeb Application Security Project (OWASP) Internet of
Things Project is designed to “help manufacturers, developers, and
consumers better understand the security issues associated with
the Internet of Things, and to enable users in any context to make
better security decisions when building, deploying, or assessing IoT
technologies.” [8] A number of the documents that this project has
produced overlap with the scope of this survey, and include:
• IoT Attack Surface Areas
• IoT Testing Guides
• IoT Security Guidance
• Principles of IoT Security
• IoT Framework Assessment
The project looks at various specific vulnerabilities (memory
overflow, weak passwords in authentication web pages and user
software, etc) and open attack surfaces present on IoT devices,
and address them with general security guidelines since the scope
of the project is attempting to address universal testing surfaces
for IoT devices [29]. This survey addresses the same problem of
security vulnerabilities affecting multiple IoT devices, but goes
about addressing the problem by highlighting existing solutions
and best practices rather than developing a testing framework that
would secure against common attack surfaces.
In [12], the authors do a thorough security analysis of always-on,
customer oriented devices with potential to impact the physical
environment they’re in significantly if hacked. Their methodology
was to install and configure each device according to manufacturer
instruction, and run each devices separately through a variety of
tests that either involved inspecting network traffic, reverse en-
gineering device software, or impersonating captured traffic. The
authors found that “product manufacturers weren’t focused enough
on security and privacy, as a design priority, putting consumers at
risk for an attack or physical intrusion.”
In [23], the authors:
(1) Discuss the differences between CPS (cyber-physical sys-
tems) and IoT - IoT being more focused on the networking/
communication potential of multiple CPS
(2) Discuss the architecture of the IoT (same three layers as used
in the specific devices section in this paper)
(3) Discuss enabling technologies and challenges in the different
layers of architecture for the IoT
(4) Discuss security and privacy drawbacks and benefits from
using IoT
(5) Discuss integrating Fog/ Edge computing and the IoT
The authors are looking at a higher level than the specifics of
connected home IoT, but discussion in it and related papers affect
this field.
This survey addresses a different problem than what the authors
of this survey were trying to accomplish, since their survey lays
out IoT and CPS in a fog/edge computing context, and less so in
a connected home context, as well as listing potential drawbacks
and benefits of IoT devices rather than practical ones. This survey
spends more time on existing vulnerabilities and existing solutions
to security and privacy issues concerning IoT devices in the field.
The authors of this paper [24], binary analysis, network anal-
ysis, etc to show the inherent vulnerabilities in one JoyLink SDK
solution.
The authors also point to work on security analysis of different
specific devices, namely the Philips Hue lightbulb and various de-
vices developed by FitBit, highlighting the focus of these papers on
specific device security over general security and privacy concerns.
Regarding protocols used commonly by smart home devices,
the authors highlight various flaws found in the Zigbee and BLE
protocols respectively by this paper [30] and this paper [4].
In [26], the authors catalog the current status of IoT security,
at the level of the different common application designs and vul-
nerabilities in most IoT devices. The paper uses the perception-
application-network layering for IoT devices, and talks about the
security features and principles required for IoT device security.
Namely: confidentiality, integrity, availability, authentication, “light
solutions” , heterogeneity, “policies” , and having “key management
systems” . The paper lists security challenges for each layer, and
a small list of countermeasures that can be taken to secure each
layer.
The authors also highlight the state of IoT security research,
mostly being that it is full of potential countermeasures that are
limited in addressing the concerns presented.
3 CASE STUDIES OF SAMPLE DEVICE
SECURITY VULNERABILITIES
3.1 Introduction
This section will cover specific vulnerabilities of specific devices,
each chosen to be somewhat representative of a larger majority
of devices similar to it in design, either architecturally or through
software.
The devices are:
• Samsung SmartCam
– Chosen as an example of an IP Camera that receives some
software updates after initial release
• Sricam SP009 IP Webcam
– Chosen as an example of an IP camera that receives no
software updates after initial release
• Nest Smoke Alarm
– Chosen as an example of a connected home safety device
and home sensor. Similar devices might include the Philip
Hue Lightbulb, Belkin Smart Switch, Pixstar Photo Frame,
Withings Home baby monitor, etc
• Hello Barbie
– Chosen as an example of a connected home smart toy, or
home entertainment device
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• Amazon Echo
– Chosen as an example of a digital voice assistant. Similar
devices might include the Google Home, Amazon Echo
Dot, Apple HomePod, Insignia Voice, etc
• HP Envy Printer
– Chosen as an example of a WiFi enabled printer with mo-
bile print capabilities that is open to internet connections
3.2 Samsung SmartCam
3.2.1 Intended Use. The Samsung SmartCam is an internet-
enabled remote monitoring camera with real-time alarm and audio/
video recording, two way audio, and low light video conditions that
is meant for connected home security systems. The idea is that this
allows a homeowner to have a available-anywhere private video
and audio feed to important areas to their home. There were apps
available for Android and iOS to enable homeowners to also check
these feeds using their phones.
3.2.2 Application Layer Vulnerabilities.
Remote root command execution. Remote management software
for the device failed to properly escape user input while accepting
firmware upgrades, providing attackers a vector for remote root
command execution.
DNS Spoofing. The Samsung SmartCam fails to implement DNSSEC
protocols that prevent DNS spoofing attacks. This gives attackers a
vector to impersonate server or user traffic mid-transaction, possi-
bly capturing sensitive information.
Open and Vulnerable Ports (TCP/UDP). The Samsung SmartCam
has many open and responsive ports listening on the public in-
ternet, one of which is vulnerable to automated discovery. This,
coupled with other network vulnerabilities, cause this device to be
vulnerable either to denial of service attacks to itself, or reflecting
traffic from one malicious source to another target.
3.2.3 Network Layer Vulnerabilities.
Reflection attacks. This device is vulnerable to a number of dif-
ferent reflection attacks1, where network traffic from a malicious
source is reflected by a compromised device to a target.
3.3 Sricam SP009 IP Webcam
3.3.1 Intended Use. The Sricam SP009 IP Webcam is intended to
be an easy to use, quick to setup home or business security solution,
providing wireless video monitoring, night-time video, and audio
recording.
3.3.2 Application Layer Vulnerabilities.
Easily Discoverable Video Feed URLs. Researchers were able to
discover an unencrypted video feed broadcast by the IP camera
using a list of commonly used video feed URLs for the video broad-
cast protocol used by the camera. Streams were unencrypted, and
required no authentication in order to view them, posing a privacy
risk to users of this camera.
1 ICMP Reflection. SNMP Reflection. SNMP Public Community String Reflection. See
this paper [25] for details.
Plain Text Mobile Application Credentials. In the companion mo-
bile application for the camera, researchers were able to discover
the IP camera’s credentials being stored in a plain text format, pos-
ing authentication issues for users of the accompanying mobile app
and this camera.
3.3.3 Network Layer Vulnerabilities.
Unencrypted communication. All communications between IP
Camera, phone, and server were broadcast in plain text, which is a
significant security risk. Researchers were able to capture network
credentials by inspecting data in-transit.
3.4 Nest Smoke Alarm
3.4.1 Intended Use. The Nest Smoke Alarm is intended to a be
an easy to use, quick to setup smoke alarm that gives the user the
ability to check carbon dioxide levels, mute false alarms, give phone
and voice alerts when the alarm is about to go off, and periodically
tests its own battery and speaker to ensure it’s able to respond in
an emergency.
3.4.2 Network Layer Vulnerabilities.
DNS Spoofing. The Nest smoke alarm fails to implement DNSSEC
protocols that prevent DNS spoofing attacks. This gives attackers a
vector to impersonate server or user traffic mid-transaction, possi-
bly capturing sensitive information.
Fake Server. This device communicates with a server that fails
to identify itself as valid, giving attackers a vector at spoofing and
capturing user data via MiTM attacks.
Open Ports. This device has open but not vulnerable ports.
Reflection Attacks. This device is vulnerable to ICMP reflection
attacks.
3.5 Hello Barbie
3.5.1 Intended Use. Hello Barbie is a toy developed by Mattel
that responds to user voice commands via a companion phone app
by playing different pre-defined lines in response [5].
3.5.2 Application Layer Vulnerabilities.
Weak Passwords. Themobile API and Toytalk website allow users
to use weak passwords, which leaves user accounts open to brute
force and dictionary password attacks.
No Password Brute Force Protections. The mobile API and Toytalk
website allow unlimited password guesses, which combined with
allowing weak passwords open user accounts open to brute force
and dictionary password attacks.
URL Redirect. Clients of the Hello Barbie Companion application
can be sent malicious toytalk.com links, which might redirect users
to phishing websites, or an HTTP version of toytalk.com that might
expose session cookies.
Mutual Configuration Authentication. The Hello Barbie Com-
panions use the same mutual certificate for authentication and
4
configuration of the device. This opens user devices to being con-
figured by a malicious actor with access to this certificate, without
asking for additional per-device authentication.
Password Reset Page Expiration. The password reset page for user
accounts does not expire. This opens users to an attack where a
user clicks on a link which resets their password, opening their
password to be set by an attacker later.
Unauthenticated Audio File Access. There is no authentication
to access audio files uploaded by the Hello Barbie Companion to
cloudfront.net, which opens up the possibility of user content being
consumed by malicious actors without permission.
Username Enumeration. The mobile API allows attackers to be
able to verify that certain user accounts exist.
3.5.3 Network Layer Vulnerabilities.
Sensitive Information via HTTP. Several layers in the application
use HTTP instead of HTTPS.
Stored Cross-Site Scripting. Malicious Javascript stored on the
tools.toytalk domain could be used to allow persistent backdoor
access.
Improper Cookie Storage. The secure flag for cookies stored on
the Hello Barbie Companion website is not set, which can allow for
cookies to be sent insecurely over HTTP.
Unencrypted WiFi Pairing. While pairing, the Hello Barbie Com-
panion uses an unencrypted WiFi network to pair and configure
the device.
Logged Application IDs. The application ID is stored in Logcat
for the Android application, which opens up user session hijacking
if Logcat output is leaked.
Unlimited CORS. CORS requests are not constrained to appli-
cation websites, which opens up any website to be able to make
Cross-Origin requests to puppeteer.toytalk.com.
DNS Spoofing. The Samsung SmartCam fails to implement DNSSEC
protocols that prevent DNS spoofing attacks. This gives attackers a
vector to impersonate server or user traffic mid-transaction, possi-
bly capturing sensitive information.
3.6 Amazon Echo
3.6.1 Intended Use. “The Amazon Echo is a hands-free, voice-
activated, virtual assistant that uses the Amazon Alexa service to
answer questions or to allow you to give commands such as to
play music, set alarms or to control smart home devices that are
Alexa-compatible.” [13]
3.6.2 Perception Layer Vulnerabilities.
Malicious Voice Command. As is the case with any improperly-
configured interactive voice assistant, not constraining the voices
that are able to make commands to the Amazon Echo can have
unintended side effects. [15]
Non-human Voice Command. Related to vulnerabilities in other
interactive voice assistants, commands can be sent to the Amazon
Echo via means not intelligible or discernible to humans, as de-
scribed in this paper. [6] This leaves the option of large numbers of
interactive voice assistants, like the Amazon Echo, to be controlled
with television advertising or by playing audio into a home.
3.6.3 Application Layer Vulnerabilities.
Gaining Root-Level Access to System. Through a process outlined
by these [20] researchers (and alternative route here2), root-level
access of the Amazon Echo can be gained by an attacker of the de-
vice. Many hardware-level root attacks have been fixed by Amazon
as they’ve been reported.
3.6.4 Network Layer Vulnerabilities.
Replay Attacks. Researchers were able to replay packets sent
from the Amazon Echo. [20] This leaves open the possibility for
attackers, possibly knowing the contents of the already encrypted
HTTPS packets, replaying a purchase or transaction repeatedly to
deplete a user’s card or bank account.
METADATA. Researchers found that it’s possible in theory, and
specifically for four devices, to use characteristics of encrypted
data streams coming into and out of an ISP to glean sensitive infor-
mation about users. For example, sleep and other health monitors
broadcasting information to backend or third-party servers could
give away users’ sleep patterns and nighttime habits to a passive
observer, based on a three step strategy used in the paper.
3.7 HP Envy Printer
3.7.1 Intended Use. The HP Envy printer is a wireless all-in-one
printer and scanner intended to be easy to setup and quick to use
for home printing needs. The printer communicates with a mobile
application that allows printing from various mobile devices.
3.7.2 Application Layer Vulnerabilities.
Plaintext Device to User Application Communication. The HP
Envy printer allows plain text device to user application commu-
nication, which leaves users of the printer and user application
vulnerable to attackers either obtain sensitive information via in-
specting network packets, or by rendering the printer unusable
through issuing simple commands without encryption or authenti-
cation.
Replay Attacks. Researchers found that the HP Envy printer was
vulnerable to replay attacks, where an attacker would obtain a net-
work packet in-transit to the printer, and replay the communication
repeatedly to render the printer unusable.
Fake Server. This device communicates with a server that fails
to identify itself as valid, giving attackers a vector at spoofing and
capturing user data via MiTM attacks.
3.7.3 Network Layer Vulnerabilities.
2 https://github.com/echohacking/wiki/wiki/Echo got fixed too
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Open and Vulnerable Ports (TCP/UDP). The HP Envy printer has
many open and responsive ports listening on the public internet, all
of which are open to automated discovery, and to telnet connections.
This, coupled with other network vulnerabilities, cause this device
to be vulnerable either to much more complex denial of service
attacks to itself, or reflecting traffic from one malicious source to
another target.
Reflection attacks. This device is vulnerable to a number of dif-
ferent reflection attacks3, where network traffic from a malicious
source is reflected by a compromised device to a target.
DNS Spoofing. The HP Envy printer fails to implement DNSSEC
protocols that prevent DNS spoofing attacks. This gives attack-
ers a vector to impersonate server or user traffic mid-transaction,
possibly capturing sensitive information.
4 BEST PRACTICES
4.1 OWASP Security Guidance
OWASP gives a categorized list of security best practices for man-
ufacturers, developers, and users of IoT devices as part of its IoT
project, launched January 2017 to help improve IoT device security.
Briefly, those categories are as follows:
(1) Insecure Web Interface
(2) Insufficient Authentication/ Authorization
(3) Insecure Network Services
(4) Lack of Transport Encryption
(5) Privacy Concerns
(6) Insecure Cloud Interface
(7) Insecure Mobile Interface
(8) Insufficient Security Configurability
(9) Insecure Software/ Firmware
(10) Poor Physical Security
As well, a general guideline offered by this document is to en-
able updates for all IoT devices, to mitigate the risk of common
vulnerabilities being propagated by un-updateable product releases.
4.2 Choosing Secure Communication Protocols
The authors of this paper4 review various high-use smart home
IoT protocols, their architecture and known vulnerabilities, and
arrived at Z-Wave, with caveats5, as a best candidate for a secure
communications protocol.
4.3 Taking Inventory of Vulnerabilities
Many security researchers and major companies developing IoT
devices [2] take regular inventory of vulnerabilities discovered for
similar devices6, and engage in penetration testing on their own
devices. Tools like Nessus, Qualys, Burp Suite that are targeted
towards finding common vulnerabilities in devices can be used to
harden existing devices.
3 ICMP Reflection. SNMP v1 Reflection. See this paper [25] for details.
4 An overview of wireless IoT protocol security in the smart home domain
5 The authors highlight that attacks on insufficient implementations of Z-Wave don’t
compromise the security of the protocol as a whole.
6 Through a security vulnerability database like NIST.
4.4 Taking steps within a Home
The authors of this paper [14] offered four strategies consumers
might use to make their own homes secure, all of which focused
on masking sensitive characteristics of network traffic and nodes
in a home WiFi network.
5 DISCUSSION
As it stands, security research and practice has a ways to go in
the domain of connected home internet of things devices, espe-
cially as it’s reviewed in literature and reflected in practice, security
and privacy are often lower priorities than convenience in newer
fields of technology. I want to bring some attention to some in-
teresting propositions for securing the widely expanding, mostly
insecure IoT network that went beyond specifying a new protocol
or highlighting weaknesses in existing ones. [19] [22] [27] [30] [32]
In [21], the authors lay out a gateway based firewall solution
(named Heimdall) for the problem of distributed denial of service
attacks coming frommany, non updated IoT devices. The idea is that
the cost of updating devices will continue to drive manufacturers
to not continue providing security updates for their products, and
solutions for security have to go beyond securing the software on
the device and the physical device itself.
In [33], the authors demonstrate a systematic, scalable, scanning
approach to identifying vulnerable devices exposed to the public
internet, and highlight the vulnerable state of the internet of things.
Using a search engine targeted for the IoT7, researchers were able
to target pervasive consumer grade products and scan them using
a security vulnerability scanner, and demonstrate that a significant
portion of the internet was vulnerable to attacks similar to ones
described earlier.
In [18], the authors propose a virtualization based framework to
securing IoT devices, where the computation and control of a de-
vice’s sensors would be handled by a virtualized cluster that would
handle computation and network tasks, which then wouldn’t suffer
the same lightweight and low-impact security protocol requires
for existing devices. Continued research has yet to be done on the
feasibility of a framework like this one.
6 CONCLUSION
There have been many initiatives to bring more focus to the subject
[34], but there’s still a long way to go before we stop seeing the
same or similar vulnerabilities appear on broad swaths of consumer-
available IoT devices. Hopefully the work presented, as well as
continued efforts to highlight the growing need for security and
privacy as first-class citizens in all aspects of technology, will spark
continued discussion on security for connected home IoT devices.
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